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WORKERS OF THE GAMING WORLD, UNITE! 
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF THE VIDEO GAME 
INDUSTRY IN THE AFTERMATH OF AB 5 
Natalie Kalbakian* 
The video game industry is a rapidly growing and lucrative entertain-
ment market.  It has played an immense role in shaping the consumption of 
media.  However, the reality of working conditions for the industry labor 
force largely behind these innovations is much less impressive.  This Note 
examines the video game industry as a case study for the potential impact of 
California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5”) on industries that heavily rely on inde-
pendent contractors with specialized skill sets. 
First, this Note advances the argument that the video game industry has 
engaged in regulatory arbitrage by capitalizing on the loopholes created as a 
result of ambiguities in California employment classification laws.  Since the 
three-prong “ABC” test from Dynamex Operations West, Incorporated v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles introduces a stronger presumption of em-
ployee status, AB 5 will compel video game companies to adjust their poli-
cies to avoid misclassification penalties.  Next, this Note predicts that wide-
spread reclassification will bolster the movement to unionize industry 
workers.  Lastly, this Note contends that the social and political costs of mis-
classification will soon outweigh its short-term gains for companies that 
could better serve their shareholders’ interests by operating under the theory 
of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”).  As such, it is no longer sustain-
able for companies to tolerate strikes over mass layoffs, unflattering press 
coverage over “crunch” periods, worker burnout, and high turnover rates. 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Class of 2021.  The author wishes to 
thank Dean Michael Waterstone for helping develop the topic and offering his feedback.  She would 
like to express her gratitude to Professor Elizabeth Pollman, Professor Cornelia Dai, Professor 
Brian Walton, and Professor Robert Brain for sharing expertise in their respective fields.  She would 
also like to thank her parents, Mesrob and Melina Kalbakian, sister, Arminé Kalbakian, and friends 
for their love, support, and unwillingness to read earlier drafts.  Lastly, she would like to 
acknowledge her friend Eda Harotounian for introducing her to the world of video game crunch 
and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review editorial board and staff for their efforts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A newly hired worker at Sledgehammer Games receives a symbolic 
challenge coin to memorialize his place in the company as a new team mem-
ber.1  The token represents the company’s appreciation for the worker’s cre-
ative contributions and is an investment in the worker’s career development.2  
While Sledgehammer Games has a positive reputation in the video game in-
dustry for fostering a healthy work environment and a low turnover rate, this 
experience is uncommon among the industry’s workers.3  Often dissatisfied 
with their working conditions, most workers for other companies receive no 
more than token concessions.4  The video game industry presently ranks as 
one of the most profitable sectors of entertainment at approximately $131 
billion, and is estimated to potentially generate up to $300 billion in profits 
in the near future.5  The industry has found a home in California, where up 
to $32 billion of its gross domestic product is apportioned.6 
The adoption of the video game industry into the mainstream and its 
expansion into new avenues of revenue has been shouldered by company 
workers whose skills are paramount to the production of quality games.7  
 
1.  Ryan Fleming, Inside Sledgehammer Games and the Biggest Gamble You Never Knew 




3. Id.; Alana Semuels, ‘Every Game You Like Is Built on the Backs of Workers.’ Video 
Game Creators Are Burned Out and Desperate for Change, TIME (June 11, 2019), https://time.com
/5603329/e3-video-game-creators-union/ [https://perma.cc/N6ZM-JXFG]. 
4.  Semuels, supra note 3. 
5. Liz Lanier, Video Games Could Be a $300 Billion Industry by 2025 (Report), VARIETY 
(May 1, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://variety.com/2019/gaming/news/video-games-300-billion-indus-
try-2025-report-1203202672/ [https://perma.cc/28QX-A6FC]; Investing in the Soaring Popularity 
of Gaming, REUTERS (June 13, 2018, 7:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/sponsored/article/popu-
larity-of-gaming?utm_source=reddit.com [https://perma.cc/RLA2-D699]. 
6. These estimates are based on reports in 2018.  Matt Fernandez, California Risks Losing 
Its Lead in the Video Game Industry, VARIETY (Feb. 13, 2018, 5:26 PM), https://variety.com/2018
/digital/news/milken-institute-california-video-game-1202697483/ [https://perma.cc/9VKR-
QYT8]. 
7. Ben Gilbert, Grueling, 100-hour Work Weeks and ‘Crunch Culture’ Are Pushing the 
Video Game Industry to a Breaking Point. Here’s What’s Going On., BUSINESS INSIDER (May 9, 
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Behind the quick turnaround for every new change or in-game item ordered 
by executives are developers who suffer the physical, mental, and social 
strains induced by perpetual periods of overtime, referred to as “crunch.”8  
During these periods of “crunch,” workers are required to complete addi-
tional, unpaid hours—sometimes up to eighty hours per week—to finish 
work or improvements on a game by publishers’ deadlines.9  Before the latest 
“shift in revenue sources,”10 “crunch” periods only impacted employees in 
the weeks leading up to a game’s release date.11  But the increased demands 
for improvements delay release dates and extend “crunch” periods through-
out the year.12  While executives are best positioned to reap the profits from 
this labor, the current gaming business model is structured such that video 
game workers are treated as essentially disposable.13  Even after contributing 
countless “crunch” hours, they are vulnerable to periodic layoffs.14 
Part II of this Note examines the impact of the “ABC” employment 
classification test formulated by the California Supreme Court in 
 
2019, 7:13 AM). https://www.businessinsider.com/video-game-development-problems-crunch-
culture-ea-rockstar-epic-explained-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/2U93-77W8]. 
8. Ilker Koksal, Video Gaming Industry & Its Revenue Shift, FORBES (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:50 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ilkerkoksal/2019/11/08/video-gaming-industry—its-revenue-
shift/#369c5ed3663e [https://perma.cc/YER2-5ZJX]; Semuels, supra note 3.  The release of the 
game Red Dead Redemption 2 reportedly required Rockstar Games employees to work 100 hours 
a week.  Leila McNeill, Video Game Workers See Power in a Union, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 
15, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/153892/riot-game-workers-union [https://perma.cc
/D2AR-DYXU]. 
9. Semuels, supra note 3; McNeill, supra note 8. 
10. The industry has employed new strategies to monetize the gaming experience including 
in-game purchases for free online games and constant updates.  Koksal, supra note 8.   
11. Semuels, supra note 3. 
12. Id.; Jason Schreier, Video Game Delays Cause More Crunch, KOTAKU (Jan. 17, 2020, 
12:45 PM), https://kotaku.com/game-delays-cause-more-crunch-1841065204 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC
/B9ML-9Z7L]. 
13. See, e.g., Gary Putka, Company Insiders Are Selling Stock During Buyback Programs 
and Making Additional Profits When Stock Prices Jump. And It’s legal., WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 
6, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/company-insiders-are-
selling-stock-during-buyback-programs-and-making-additional-profits-when-stock-prices-jump-
and-its-legal/2019/11/06/fc592f58-e493-11e9-a331-2df12d56a80b_story.html [https://perma.cc
/X338-R9CY]; Semuels, supra note 3. 
14. Semuels, supra note 3. 
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Dynamex Operations West, Incorporated v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
and adopted in California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5”) on the gaming business 
model for California-based companies.15  Part II also addresses the limitation 
imposed by the “ABC” test on the video game industry’s ability to use “reg-
ulatory arbitrage,” a “planning technique” that “exploits the gap between the 
economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment,” 
as a cost-saving mechanism.16  Part III conceptualizes the unionization pro-
cess for re-classified video game industry employees by using examples of 
Hollywood guilds, and outlines the potential stabilizing benefits of unioni-
zation for both employees and employers.  While the future for organized 
independent contractor efforts is less certain, this Note offers potential op-
tions for video game workers that remain independent contractors even un-
der the new classification.17  Part IV applies the stakeholder theory of corpo-
rate social responsibility (“CSR”) to the video game industry and offers the 
potential loss of social license in California as a compelling motivation for 
corporate shareholders to advocate for compliance with AB 5.18 
II. THE VIDEO GAME INDUSTRY’S ROLE IN THE GIG ECONOMY 
 Employee reclassification will have immense financial ramifications 
for video game companies.19  Apart from the direct impact on profitability, 
widespread cases of misclassification in a single industry will further ac-
centuate the problems impacting the employee workforce.  Specifically, a 
larger pool of employees will lead to higher scrutiny over “crunch” devel-
opment periods and other prevalent workplace issues in the video game 
 
15. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 
2018); Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
16. See generally Dynamex, 416 P.3d 1; Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 227, 229 (2010); Elizabeth Pollman, Tech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits, 20 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV., 567 (2019). 
17. Naomi B. Sunshine, Labor Rights for Platform Workers: A Response to Social 
Change’s 2016 Symposium, 41 HARBINGER 241, 242-244 (2016) (outlining the challenges for in-
dependent contractors). 
18. Michael J. Vargas, In Defense of E. Merrick Dodd: Corporate Social Responsibility in 
Modern Corporate Law and Investment Strategy, 73 BUS. LAW. 337, 348 (2018); see generally 
Pollman, supra note 16, at 567–68. 
19. Alison Griswold, How Much It Would Cost Uber and Lyft If Drivers Were Employees, 
QUARTZ (June 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1643263/the-cost-to-uber-and-lyft-if-drivers-were-em-
ployees/ [https://perma.cc/2337-SVKV]. 
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industry.  The way in which tests for the legal designation of employee sta-
tus will apply to video game workers must be resolved as a preliminary is-
sue. 
A. Impact of the Dynamex “ABC” Test on Video Game Worker 
Classification 
The California Supreme Court articulated the most recent iteration of 
an employee classification test in Dynamex.20  The court emphasized the im-
plications of its decision for workers, competitor businesses, and the general 
public.21  While the label assigned to a particular worker is certainly relevant 
to the classification analysis insofar as it relates to party expectations, clas-
sification tests have long treated employer behavior and the nature of the 
relationship as more determinative factors.22   
The court in Dynamex sought to reach a “resolution of the employee or 
independent contractor question” for the purposes of California wage or-
ders.23  A class of courier and delivery drivers claimed that their employer, 
Dynamex Operations West, Incorporated, had misclassified them as inde-
pendent contractors.24  The defendant company originally classified its work-
ers as employees, but “converted all of its drivers to independent contractors 
after management concluded that such a conversion would generate eco-
nomic savings for the company” after 2004.25  The plaintiff class alleged that 
the defendant violated the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 
9, which applied to their industry and provisions of the Labor Code.26  The 
court discussed definitions of key terms in dispute.  Wage Order No. 9 
 
20. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 4. 
21. Id. 
22. See Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification in the 
Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 341, 365 (2016). 
23. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5 (stating that wage orders “impose obligations relating to the 
minimum wages, maximum hours, and a limited number of very basic working conditions (such as 
minimally required meal and rest breaks) of California employees.”). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 8. 
26. Id. at 5. 
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defines the term “employ” to mean “to engage, suffer, or permit to work.”27  
According to the order, an employer is an individual who “directly or indi-
rectly . . . employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working 
conditions of a person.”28  The order did not provide guidance for the defi-
nition of an “independent contractor,” but the language indicates that only 
employees are covered.29 
The “suffer or permit to work” definition of “employ” was directly ad-
dressed in Martinez v. Combs.30  The court traced back the meaning of the 
“employ, suffer or permit” to child labor laws.31  According to the court, the 
definition was meant to capture “irregular working arrangements the propri-
etor of a business might otherwise disavow with impunity” in order to avoid 
liability.32  The Martinez court concluded that there were “three alternative 
definitions of employment for purposes of the wage order: ‘(a) to exercise 
control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or per-
mit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment 
relationship.’”33  The Dynamex court sought to answer the classification 
question under the “‘suffer or permit to work’ definition of ‘employ’” in the 
applicable wage order.34 
Prior to the court’s decision in S. G. Borello & Sons, Incorporated v. 
Department of Industrial Relations, courts relied on a common law “control 
of details” test and used factors lifted from the Restatement Second of 
Agency to resolve the employee or independent contractor question.35  In 
 
27. Id. at 13. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 14. 
30. 231 P.3d 259, 278 (Cal. 2010). 
31. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 21. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 23 (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 278). 
34. Id. at 7. 
35. Id. at 15 (listing the following Restatement factors: “(a) whether or not the one per-
forming services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with 
reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal 
or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether 
the principal or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the 
person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the 
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Borello, the employer, a cucumber grower, alleged that his hired farmwork-
ers were independent contractors because they “(1) were free to manage their 
own labor . . . , (2) shared the profit or loss from the crop, and (3) agreed in 
writing that they were not employees.”36  The court found that the lack of 
direct supervision was not dispositive since the employer “retain[ed] all nec-
essary control over a job which can be done only one way.”37  The assertion 
that the farmworkers engaged in an entrepreneurial venture was rejected.38  
The court concluded that the farmworkers were “employees as a matter of 
law” under the Workers’ Compensation Act.39  The 1989 Borello decision 
retains its significance in resolving certain classification questions.40 
The Dynamex court acknowledged the advantages of a multifactor 
standard such as the economic realities test or the Borello factors.41  A mul-
tifactor standard “calls for consideration of all potentially relevant factual 
distinctions in different employment arrangements on a case-by-case, total-
ity-of-the-circumstances basis . . . .”42  However, because of the opportuni-
ties for businesses to “evade . . . fundamental responsibilities under wage and 
hour law,” the California Supreme Court ultimately decided to adopt a test 
“most consistent with the history and purpose of the suffer or permit to work 
standard.”43  The court opted for a “simpler, more structured test for distin-
guishing between employees and independent contractors.”44  The adopted 
“ABC” test includes the following factors: 
 
method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the 
regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relationship of employer-employee.”). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 16. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 18. 
40. Id. at 20. 
41. Id. at 34. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 34–35. 
44. Id. at 34. 
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(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the 
hiring entity in connection with the performance of the work, both 
under the contract for the performance of the work and in 
fact; and (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the 
usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the 
worker is customarily engaged in an independently established 
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work per-
formed.45 
Under the ABC test, an employer has the burden of rebutting the presump-
tion that a worker is an employee and must prove each factor to do so.46  
Although employer advocates have expressed concerns over the supposed 
novelty of the ABC test, it evokes familiar factors that were already part of 
established California law.47  Nonetheless, the test introduced a more formi-
dable presumption of employee status for which employers may not have 
sufficient notice.48 
The ABC test allows for more uniform decisions to be made across 
different job titles in the video game industry.  The classification of workers, 
including level designers, content designers, art and animation game design-
ers, creative directors, writers, engineers/programmers, visual artists, audio 
artists, and testers will need to be reevaluated based on work conditions.  The 
previously used multifactor test under which factors were weighed differ-
ently by each court lent itself to less certain outcomes.49  In contrast, the ABC 
test promises “greater clarity and consistency” for an industry workforce 
with such a diverse range of talent and responsibility.50  For example, in 
Lawson v. Grubhub, the plaintiff’s attorneys argued that although the 
 
45. Id. at 7. 
46. Cornelia Dai, Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court: Employees’ Perspec-
tive, 32 CAL. LAB. & EMP. L. REV. 2, 4 (2018). 
47. See, e.g., John Skousen, New ABC Test For Independent Contractors Sends California 
Employers Reeling, FISHER PHILLIPS (July 2, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-
newsletters-article-new-abc-test-for-independent-contractors-sends [https://perma.cc/2CLC-
5XBX]; Dai, supra note 46, at 3. 
48. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40 (stating that the court’s interpretation is “faithful to its history 
and to the fundamental purpose of the wage orders.”). 
49. Dai, supra note 46, at 2; Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40. 
50. Dai, supra note 46, at 2; Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40. 
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plaintiff was found to have been properly classified as an independent con-
tractor under the Borello test, the Grubhub company would have failed to 
establish the final prong of the Dynamex test.51  A similar failure by employ-
ers to prove even a single prong of the test would yield favorable outcomes 
for video game workers seeking employee status in the future. 
1. Prong A: The Familiar Element of Control 
The first prong of the test to prove that a video game worker is in fact 
an independent contractor essentially adopts the “control” factor from the 
Borello standard.52  Video game companies will need to demonstrate that the 
worker is “free from [their] control and direction . . . in connection with the 
performance of the work.”53  Courts often consider the source of the tools 
used, whether there was a requirement to work in the office, and the level of 
control over the manner in which tasks are completed.54  This prong is often 
misinterpreted as a requirement that the hiring entity not only control the end 
product, but also the ongoing process of writing, designing, or program-
ming.55  However, courts in California have established that control does not 
require literal supervision, but rather the right or opportunity to do so.56  The 
opinion in Borello demonstrated that courts were unwilling to accept an em-
ployer’s thinly veiled claims that they did not literally supervise their agri-
cultural workers.  A company should therefore still be subject to scrutiny 
 
51. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Reply Brief at *16–18, Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 
3d 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-15386), 2019 WL 1096489.  The plaintiff’s attorneys maintain 
that Grubhub could not satisfy Prong C because the plaintiff was not running his own delivery 
service “catering to his own customers, negotiating rates of pay, and deciding which jobs to ac-
cept from which customers.”  Richard Meneghello, 3 Takeaways From Grubhub Plaintiff’s Open-
ing Appeals Brief, FISHER PHILLIPS (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/gig-em-
ployer/3-takeaways-from-grubhub-plaintiffs-opening-appeals [https://perma.cc/B4SB-H6BJ]. 
 
52. Dai, supra note 46, at 2. 
53. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 7. 
54. S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) 
(“The principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is ren-
dered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”). 
55. Id. at 407. 
56. Id. at 401 (arguing that an employer retained control even in the absence of direct su-
pervision). 
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even if, for example, a concept artist is offered a fixed amount for images 
and is not supervised during every step of her work.57 
The context of the specific industry should be taken into consideration 
in the analysis of this first prong.  Since worker progress is often monitored 
at the office and workers are expected to attend company meetings, they do 
not seem free to make independent decisions about the direction of the 
game.58  Even in cases where the work is completed remotely, workers do 
not have the “final say on anything that happens in the company, sometimes 
even down to the finest detail,” which does not give them much discretion.59  
Some companies have required that contractors wear different colored 
badges and even hired “contingent workforce management” agencies to 
oversee them.60  But a policy utilized to internally distinguish between em-
ployees and contractors through use of different uniforms or badges does 
little to change their actual legal classification as an employee or contractor.  
Such policies do not cure cases of misclassification.  Companies would ulti-
mately lose on this front for jobs related to development, production, and 
promotion of their product.  They have the opportunity, which they certainly 
exercise, to control the manner in which the work is done through supervi-
sion and make decisions about the final product. 
2. Prong B: Usual Course of Business 
To prove that their workers are independent contractors, the second 
prong of the test requires that companies indicate that the worker “performs 
work outside the usual course of [their] business.”61  Since a programmer, 
writer, or designer’s “role within the hiring entity’s usual business operation 
align[ ] with the work of the employee,” the employers would fail to prove 
 
57. Id. at 407 (outlining factors in favor of employee classification such as special skill). 
58. Colin Campbell, The Game Industry’s Disposable Workers, POLYGON (Dec. 19, 2016, 
9:00 AM), https://www.polygon.com/features/2016/12/19/13878484/game-industry-worker-mis-
classification [https://perma.cc/LSG9-UMS3]. 
59. Sam Matthews, 25 Crazy Guidelines Nintendo Employees Need To Follow, THEGAMER 
(Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.thegamer.com/nintendo-guidelines-employees-follow/ [https://
perma.cc/SW2Q-96A3]. 
60. Campbell, supra note 58. 
61. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 
2018). 
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this prong.62  Companies would face a challenge in arguing, for instance, that 
a video game programmer’s role was not at the core of the business.  A com-
puter technician fixing the receptionist’s computer at a nail salon, for in-
stance, does not carry out a role within the employer’s usual business oper-
ation.63  Conversely, a content designer or graphics programmer working on 
a game set to be released in a few months works on projects that align with 
the business of the hiring entity: developing and publishing video games.  
The contributions of the aforementioned workers are not merely incidental 
to the business, but rather necessary for publishing companies to produce 
their source of revenue.  Without the ongoing work of engineers, developers, 
designers, and programmers, a company’s game might lose popularity with 
gamers and the company could lose revenue from in-game purchases. 
3. Prong C: Independently Established Business 
Employers hoping to maintain the independent contractor status of their 
workers must also prove the third and final prong, that the worker is “cus-
tomarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or busi-
ness of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.”64  The ma-
terials required for many industry jobs may not be accessible to workers.  
Engineers, designers, testers, and artists require “high-powered computer[s] 
and specialized software” that may be too expensive for a worker to purchase 
and operate at home.65  In the case of video game development, hiring entities 
dedicate a considerable percentage of their budgets to furnish their facilities 
with the proper equipment required.66  In fact, updates and ongoing issues 
require recurrent budget allocations to hardware and software replace-
ments.67  This part of the test could also be determined in favor of employee 
 
62. Id. at 37. 
63. Id. (providing an analogy about a plumber hired at a retail store to clarify the application 
of the first prong of the “ABC” test). 
64. Id. at 14. 
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status because of the time restraint imposed on programmers.68  Even if in-
dividuals with strenuous workdays producing game updates obtained side 
jobs as a means to supplement their income, they would experience great 
difficulty maintaining another job in the area of programming.  In this case, 
it is the side job that would be more aptly characterized as the “gig.”69 
Courts often look for indications of “licensure, advertising, routine of-
ferings to the public to perform the work, his own clientele[, and] . . . main-
taining separate places of business” to prove this prong.70  Employers may 
prevail under this prong if their workers knowingly held themselves out as 
contractors in the same field.71  For example, an employer might produce  
evidence that a given video game writer simultaneously works for another 
company to create game storylines and dialogue and does so with his per-
sonal laptop. 
A less generous interpretation of the final prong for employers is that 
it is insufficient to merely prove that the worker has not been prevented from 
pursuing other business opportunities.72  This was illustrated in Garcia v. 
Border Transportation Group LLC, where the court considered whether 
there was an “existing, not potential, showing of independent business oper-
ation.”73  If video game workers are not “tak[ing] the usual steps to establish 
and promote” a business, then the final prong should not be satisfied.74  This 
would require that the worker “hold[ ] himself out to be in business for 
 
68. Sam Dean, As Video Games Make Billions, the Workers Behind Them Say It’s Time to 
Unionize, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-
fi-tn-video-game-union-movement-20190412-story.html [https://perma.cc/T58E-DMJ9]. 
69. Jim Chappelow, Gig Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/terms/g/gig-economy.asp [https://perma.cc/CZ28-QCTF] (stating that gig workers 
retain flexible, “part-time or temporary positions”). 
70. Meneghello, supra note 51. 
71. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 39 (Cal. 
2018). 
72. Id. 
73. Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLC, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 373 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018) (modified, Nov. 13, 2018). 
74. Id. at 369. 
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oneself” as an independent business owner, which may be difficult for em-
ployers to prove in every case.75 
The adopted California test reveals that many workers across different 
titles in the video game industry may have been misclassified as independent 
contractors.76  In fact, heightened scrutiny may further reveal that these 
workers were misclassified even under the Borello test, which emphasized a 
focus on “statutory purpose.”77  Programmers, writers, artists, and designers 
each have specialized contributions that are equally necessary to the creation 
of the final product, and are therefore central to the business.  Ultimately, 
employers could not avoid the liabilities of misclassification if a worker’s 
argument for only one or two prongs is insubstantial.78  Although the ruling 
only controls in California, it was not the first jurisdiction to adopt this em-
ployee-friendly standard.79  The test followed a similar standard used in Mas-
sachusetts, indicating a growing trend towards targeting gig economies.80  
Since California courts are notable for setting the trend in the areas of labor 
and employment law, the influence of the ABC test might be far-reaching, 
even as gig employers push back against its expansive application and 
threaten to relocate.81 
  
 
75. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37 n.11. 
76. Campbell, supra note 58; Michael Arin, Esports & Employment After Dynamex, 
ESPORTS BAR ASS’N, https://esportsbar.org/journals/2019/10/esports-and-employment-after-dy-
namex [https://perma.cc/U2T9-REQB] (addressing the risks of misclassification in the video game 
industry as it pertains to esports players). 
77. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 16; Dai, supra note 46, at 3 (stating that Borello “requires an 
analysis that takes into account the public policy reasons for the legislation, which means a view 
toward protecting the rights of employees.”). 
78. See Dai, supra note 46, at 1. 
79. Id. 
80. Id.; Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 7. 
81. Susan Nikdel, What You Need to Know About New California Employment Law Going 
Into Effect in 2020, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/what-
you-need-to-know-about-new-california-employment-law-going-effect-2020 [https://perma.cc
/UCZ3-KWLK]. 
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B. California AB 5: The Key to Gaming Industry Workforce 
Reclassification 
The California State Legislature passed AB 5, a law that adopts the 
Dynamex ABC test, to determine an employee or independent contractor sta-
tus in 2019.82  The Bill was passed in an effort to support gig-economy work-
ers and recoup state taxes from businesses that derive unfair advantages 
through misclassification.83  Legislators argued that worker misclassification 
played a “significant factor in the erosion of the middle class and the rise in 
income inequality.”84  AB 5 was subsequently added as section 2750.3 of the 
California Labor Code.85  Section 2750.3 affirmed the existing presumption 
that “a worker who performs services for a hirer is an employee for purposes 
of claims for wages and benefits arising under wage orders issued by the 
Industrial Welfare Commission.”86  It also expanded the coverage of the nar-
row Dynamex decision by encompassing the entire Labor Code, the Unem-
ployment Insurance Code, and the wage orders of the Industrial Welfare 
Commission.87  Since AB 5 is not limited to wage orders, it functions as a 
broader safety net for workers.88  For example, in Garcia, the court did not 
apply Dynamex to a non-wage claim.89  However, upon the codification of 
the ABC test, the fact that a dispute does not arise under a wage order no 
 
82. See generally Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
83. See generally id.; Nellie Bowles & Noam Scheiber, California Wanted to Protect Uber 
Drivers. Now It May Hurt Freelancers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/12/31/technology/california-freelance-gig-workers.html [https://perma.cc/HMF5-NKZP]. 
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (West 2019). 
85. Id. 
86. Cal. Assemb. B. 5. 
87. See id.  The court’s holding in Dynamex was limited to wage claims. 
88. Tony Marks, How Do You Spell Trouble? California AB5, FORBES (Sept. 11, 2019, 
11:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonymarks/2019/09/11/how-do-you-spell-trouble-cali-
fornia-ab-5/#311b06d47e29 [https://perma.cc/WCD3-8DGU]. 
89. Garcia v. Border Transp. Grp., LLC, 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 360, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018) (modified, Nov. 13, 2018). 
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longer shields employers from the Dynamex standard.90  The two unresolved 
issues regarding AB 5 are related to its retroactive impact and the list of ex-
empt occupations. 
1. Retroactive Application 
The first crucial issue that would impact the video game industry along 
with other gig employers is AB 5’s potential retroactive impact on claims 
against companies.91  A common criticism of AB 5 is that, in an attempt to 
facilitate more predictable outcomes, the language creates newer ambigui-
ties.92  As previously detailed, under the Dynamex test, misclassified con-
tractors must be reclassified as employees, but the possibility for workers to 
obtain relief for past misclassification is not as straightforward.  The Ninth 
Circuit decided that the ABC test should be applied retroactively in Vazquez 
v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Incorporated, because the test was 
consistent with the “history of California’s employment classification 
law.”93  However, that decision was later withdrawn and the question of ret-
roactive application was certified to the California Supreme Court.94  Before 
the enactment of AB 5, this open question served as a roadblock for cases 
that were decided under the Borello standard prior to the Dynamex deci-
sion.95  Some plaintiffs sought appeals based on this newly developed 
 
90. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 (Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez states that the Bill shall be ap-
plied to the Labor Code, Unemployment Insurance Code, and the Industrial Welfare Commission’s 
wage orders). 
91. Dai, supra note 46, at 3; Catherine Shu, Uber and Postmates Claim Gig Worker Bill 
AB-5 Is Unconstitutional in New Lawsuit, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 30, 2019, 8:53 PM), https://
techcrunch.com/2019/12/30/uber-and-postmates-claim-gig-worker-bill-ab-5-is-unconstitutional-
in-new-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/28ZU-SAL2]. 
92.  Bowles & Scheiber, supra note 83. 
93. Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc., 923 F.3d 575, 589 (9th Cir. 2019); 
Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 40 (Cal. 2018). 
94. Vazquez, 939 F.3d at 1048 (stating that the novel question should be decided in light of 
public policy implications). 
95. See generally Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(finding that a Grubhub driver was an independent contractor and not an employee because the 
defendant did not exercise sufficient control).   
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standard.96  In response to the motion for relief filed by the plaintiff in Law-
son v. Grubhub, the defense argued against retrofitting the new ABC frame-
work to analyze the employment classification in dispute.97  They argued it 
would be unduly burdensome on businesses to not only absorb the costs of 
reclassification to avoid further litigation under the new standard, but also 
incur financial burdens of retroactive claims.98 
The threat of losing companies to other states due to overburdensome 
laws in California might persuade the California Supreme Court to limit ret-
roactivity.99  It may further be argued that retroactive application would in-
troduce perverse incentives for employers not to immediately comply with 
the law in order to avoid conceding that they had previously misclassified 
employees.  Since the legislative purpose of AB 5 was to protect workers 
from the harms of misclassification, the public policy rationale against ret-
roactive enforcement may be the most compelling argument for courts.  
Those opposed to retroactive application could argue that retroactive en-
forcement of this supposedly new test is less about the welfare of workers 
and more aimed at penalizing companies. 
The argument that retroactive enforcement is unduly burdensome is 
based on the assumption that the legal standard relied on by businesses when 
initially classifying their employees was considerably different from the Dy-
namex approach.100  However, the California Second District Court of Ap-
peals in Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Incorporated undermined the ar-
gument for the test to be enforced only prospectively.101  The court stated 
 
96. See, e.g., Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No.15-cv-05128-JSC, 2018 WL 6190316, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2018) (stating that the plaintiff filed a motion for relief merely four months 
after the Dynamex decision). 
97. Id. at *7. 
98. The defense argues that retroactive application might violate constitutional due process 
rights.  Id. 
99. Louis Hyman, California’s New Gig Economy Law Was Meant to Help Workers. But it 
Will Likely Hurt Them Instead, CNN BUS. (Jan. 9, 2020, 8:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01
/09/perspectives/california-ab5/index.html [https://perma.cc/D7A6-P8U5]; Bruce Sarchet et al., 
AB 5: The Great California Employment Experiment—A Littler Workplace Policy Institute Report, 
LITTLER (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/ab-5-great-califor-
nia-employment-experiment-littler-workplace-policy [https://perma.cc/9YAB-8Q6X]. 
100. Bruce Sarchet et al., supra note 99. 
101. See Gonzales v. San Gabriel Transit, Inc., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d, 681, 687–88 (Cal. Ct. 
App). 
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that the Dynamex decision “merely clarified and streamlined” existing law 
on the matter and was thus not unduly burdensome.102  If the California Su-
preme Court accepts the Gonzales court’s characterization of the Dynamex 
decision, namely that it was not transformative, they could decide that busi-
nesses had sufficient notice about the existing Borello test.  It is difficult, 
however, to reconcile this inference with the fact that the Dynamex test not 
only introduced a stronger presumption in favor of employee status, but also 
imposed strict factors that must each be met instead of weighed against one 
another. 
Although fairness and due process are compelling grounds to rule 
against constitutionality, the Ninth Circuit Court in Vazquez stated that the 
California Supreme Court’s rejection of the request for clarification on Dy-
namex for retroactivity revealed the court’s views on the matter.103  The 
court’s view was that the new rule in Dynamex should be given “usual retro-
active application” rather than an exception.104  Even though that opinion 
was withdrawn, the court maintained that retroactive application would not 
violate an employer’s due process rights.105 
While companies are justifiably concerned about the potential financial 
burdens of retroactive application, its impact would still be restrained so as 
to prevent a “blanket pronouncement” of retroactivity.106  The retroactive 
effect seems reasonably limited to wage claims.  AB 5 also does not include 
language that allows for the revival of lapsed claims.107  It only applies if the 
underlying claim has not lapsed by January of 2020 when it became effec-
tive.108  Even so, continued conduct could still be argued in order to 
 
102. Id. at 708 n.13. 
103. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc., 923 F.3d 575, 587 (9th 
Cir. 2019). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1048. 
106. Harrison M. Thorne, Retroactive Application of Dynamex, L.A. LAW, March 2019, at 
19–20. 
107. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (West 2019). 
108. Id.; Assemb. B. 51, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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overcome an alleged lapse of a claim.109  Notwithstanding the supposed nov-
elty of the test, companies were ultimately provided sufficient notice to re-
view their policies and resolve issues before the effective date of AB 5.   
California AB 5 will work in conjunction with AB 51 to further subdue 
employers if the latter is upheld.110  AB 51 is a prohibition on certain man-
datory arbitration agreements.111  It is very restrictive from the perspective 
of employers since it does not allow them to condition employment or any 
employment benefits on the signing of an arbitration agreement for Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) or Labor Code violation claims.112  
AB 5 classification is important because AB 51 only applies to employees.113  
While the future of AB 51 is uncertain in light of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
it would be helpful to industry workers.  Most video game company workers 
sign mandatory arbitration agreements which restrict their access to 
courts.114  While some companies like Riot Games have, after facing tremen-
dous backlash, agreed to carve out exceptions to their arbitration agreements 
for incidents of sexual harassment, AB 51 would allow employees to pursue 
a claim for any employment or labor-related issues.115 
2. AB 5 Exemptions 
The second relevant issue is whether video game workers are included 
in AB 5’s list of exemptions.116  Occupations that are exempt from the 
 
109. JUSTICE KATHLEEN M. BANKE & JUSTICE JOHN L. SEGAL, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE 
GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, Ch. 4 (2019).  
110. Cal. Assemb. B. 51.; CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.6 (West 2019). 
111. Cal. Assemb. B. 51. 
112. Thomas H. Petrides, Federal Court Preliminary Enjoins Enforcement of New Califor-
nia Arbitration Law AB 51, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article
/federal-court-preliminarily-enjoins-enforcement-new-california-arbitration-law-ab-51 [https://
perma.cc/ULQ3-RF8W]. 
113. Cal. Assemb. B. 51. 
114. Josh Eidelson et al., Riot Games Keeps Arbitration Clause Despite Employee Protest, 
BLOOMBERG (May 16, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-17
/riot-games-to-keep-arbitration-clause-despite-employee-protest [https://perma.cc/7S5P-77DS].  
115. Id.; Cal. Assemb. B. 51.; LAB. § 432.6. 
116. Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
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Dynamex test that will instead be judged under the Borello test are expressly 
listed in the statute.117  Job titles in video game development do not fall under 
AB 5’s list of industry exemptions to the Dynamex test.118  These titles are 
also not listed as specific occupations exempt from the test.119  Employers 
could feasibly argue that some of their workers fall under the “professional 
services” exemptions.120  Professional services include marketing, human re-
sources administration, graphic design, fine art work, and freelance writ-
ing.121  It is unclear whether video game artists would be considered “fine” 
artists since “fine art” is not clearly defined and the language of AB 5 does 
not offer guidance on that matter.  It is nevertheless increasingly difficult for 
employers to satisfy the legislation’s stringent requirements for the specific 
occupations.  Moreover, even if an exemption applies, the worker may still 
be reclassified as an employee under the older Borello test.  This indicates 
that in-house human resources representatives or marketing workers may 
still be reclassified on a case-by-case basis. 
The question of whether video game writers should be exempt if the 
nature of their work is considered freelance is also unsettled.  Freelance writ-
ing is considered work that involves less than thirty-five submissions to an 
employer.122  But AB 5 uses language that specifically refer to journalists, so 
it is unlikely that legislators intended to encompass workers who write 
scripts for video games.123  While narrative designers exercise some level of 
control in shaping the plot of a game, a game writer “has to bow to the re-








123. Id.  The California Labor Federation’s legislative director and labor reporters have 
also only addressed the impact on freelance journalists.  Zoie Matthew, What Does AB 5 Mean for 
California’s Freelance Writers?, L.A. MAG. (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/citythink-
blog/ab-5-freelance-writers/ [https://perma.cc/5BHY-5S6H].  
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technology and the schedule.”124  These writers would be considered subject 
to the control of their employers even under the Borello standard.  As a con-
sequence, the aforementioned titles should be reclassified as employees. 
C. Consequences of Restraining Regulatory Arbitrage in the Video 
Game Industry 
Mass reclassification of workers in California will likely disrupt the 
existing business model of the video game industry.  The practice of hiring 
independent contractors that work side-by-side with employees and carry out 
some of the same work as their colleagues is a form of “regulatory arbi-
trage.”125  The financial incentive to rely heavily on contractor labor and mis-
classify workers has been made clear by the leading opposition to AB 5.126  
Proper classification of workers as employees will be costly since the indus-
try “critically . . . hinges on regulatory arbitrage.”127  Companies have pro-
tested that they would “incur significant additional expenses for compensat-
ing [workers], potentially including expenses associated with the application 
of wage and hour laws (including minimum wage, overtime, and meal and 
rest period requirements), employee benefits, social security contributions, 
taxes and penalties.”128  Employers are also obligated to pay “federal Social 
Security and payroll taxes, unemployment insurance taxes and state employ-
ment taxes” for their employees and abide by anti-retaliation and discrimi-
nation laws.129  But the risk of litigation over continued misclassification will 
 
124. David Gaider, Do You Want to Write Video Games?, POLYGON (Aug. 15, 2016, 1:30 
PM), https://www.polygon.com/2016/8/15/12455728/how-to-get-a-job-writing-games-maybe 
[https://perma.cc/9G3R-G7GK].  
125. Pollman, supra note 16, at 568 (defining “regulatory arbitrage” as a business planning 
technique used when there are “gap or differences in regulations or laws”). 
126. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Uber and Lyft Just Lost Another Battle in California, 
VOX (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/8/30/20840563
/ab-5-uber-lyft-senate-vote-california [https://perma.cc/X46L-46Q6]. 
127. Pollman, supra note 16, at 574.  
128. Uber and Lyft Just Lost Another Battle in California, supra note 126. 
129. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 
2018); Independent Contractor Versus Employee, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. REL., https://
www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm [https://perma.cc/MFP2-3KUT]. 
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impact how corporate managements assess whether the current structure is 
still a “valuable course of action to pursue or continue.”130 
Because of the overlap in employment classification practices between 
the video game industry and traditional gig companies, AB 5 may capture a 
broader swath of the state’s economy than the legislature expressly in-
tended.131  The video game industry, like gig companies, must reevaluate its 
policies by weighing the different costs of reclassification and risks of liti-
gation.132  Once workers are properly classified upon application of the more 
employee-friendly test, they will finally become entitled to federal labor pro-
tections that they were previously not afforded.133  Federal protections in-
clude family or medical leave, unemployment or worker’s compensation 
benefits, healthcare or retirement benefits, severance, overtime pay, and dis-
ability accommodations.134  Reclassification will also invariably expose 
video game publishers to more wage and hour litigation by expanding their 
pool of employees.135  The many options that reclassified employees have 
for legal recourse will be evaluated by employers.136  Lastly, there is increas-
ing support for competitors that employ more ethical and costly employment 
policies to use misclassification as a basis for unfair competition claims.137 
 
130. Pollman, supra note 16, at 570.  
131. Audrey Winn, League of Legends Gamers Could Become California’s Newest Work-
force, QUARTZ (Jan. 9, 2020), https://qz.com/1781797/californias-ab5-protects-league-of-legends-
gamer-work-rights/ [https://perma.cc/EW6T-NU5H]. 
132. Id. 
133. Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
134. Id. 
135. Sarchet et al., supra note 99. 
136. Independent Contractor Versus Employee, supra note 129 (explaining the right of em-
ployees to pursue their claims through litigation or a state agency such as the Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement).  The Attorney General or city attorney can also pursue a claim of contin-
ued misclassification against employers.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (West 2019); see generally id. 
§§ 2698–2699.5 (listing Private Attorney General Act claims as an additional option for workers 
to pursue limited damages even if subject to arbitration agreements). 
137. Richard Reibstein, New Type of Independent Contractor Misclassification Lawsuit: 
Business Vs. Business, JDSUPRA (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-type-of-
independent-contractor-80472/ [https://perma.cc/5B2H-65P7]. 
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Game developer companies failed to preempt such consequences after 
the forced reclassification of Electronic Artists’ workers in 2004, well before 
AB 5 was even discussed by the California legislature.138  The company set-
tled a $15.6 million lawsuit for misclassifying workers and withholding 
overtime wages.139  They were then compelled to reclassify approximately 
200 employees after a second lawsuit.140  It would therefore be prudent for 
employers to voluntarily review the status of each of their workers in light 
of the new standard even if they hope to lobby for an exemption or insist that 
retroactive application is unconstitutional.141  AB 5 will serve as an effective 
tool to restrain the ability of companies to evade justice. 
Once the constraints to regulatory arbitrage in the industry take effect, 
video game companies, now considerably less able to “reduce overall costs 
in [their] business affairs,” will be forced to reconsider their place in the gig 
economy and their ability to continue operating in California.142  Companies 
may argue that they can no longer remain competitive in the state without 
the cost-saving mechanism of hiring workers as contractors.143  To that end, 
these companies may also attempt to lobby for an exemption or launch a 
public campaign.  Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash have been trailblazers in that 
respect.  The companies collectively introduced a ballot measure that would 
exempt them from the Dynamex standard.144  It is presently unclear whether 
the $90 million spent on the measure will yield success.145  If the video game 
industry is unable to secure an exemption, they may decide that relocation is 
their only viable option.  However, the threat that video game companies will 
 
138. Tim Surette, EA Settles OT Dispute, Disgruntled “Spouse” Outed, GAMESPOT (April 




141. Thorne, supra note 106, at 20–21. 
142. Pollman, supra note 16, at 574.  
143. Campbell, supra note 58. 
144. John Myers, Uber, Lyft, DoorDash Launch a $90-million Fight Against California 
Labor Law, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-
10-29/uber-lyft-doordash-fight-california-labor-law-ab5 [https://perma.cc/4X33-XCSJ]. 
145. Id. 
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relocate away from California due to the higher tax rate and costs of opera-
tion rings hollow since other technology companies have “flourished in Cal-
ifornia with its particular mix of laws, including labor law that encourages 
‘knowledge spillovers’ and facilitates employee mobility.”146  California is a 
hub of creativity in the field of technology, so it is unlikely that companies 
will abandon the state.  Additionally, if the Dynamex framework is eventu-
ally adopted by other states, this plan might prove to be short-sighted and 
futile.147 
Critics of AB 5 characterize it as a misguided attempt to help workers 
that may actually end up harming them.148  For example, many gig workers 
have chosen to partake in a ridesharing venture because of the flexibility of 
hours.149  It follows that many ridesharing company drivers themselves are 
reluctant to be reclassified as employees.150  Once these workers are reclas-
sified, their employers will be able and more willing to exercise heightened 
control over their schedules.151  But in spite of these drawbacks, the workers 
will then be able to unionize and will be afforded federal labor protections 
that only cover employees.152  Furthermore, the California Supreme Court 
has clarified that “flexibility” is not impossible for employers to offer once 
a worker is properly classified.153  While independent contractors are often 
 
146. Pollman, supra note 16, at 583.  
147. Jeff Daniels, California Gig Economy Legislation Advances, Could Shape Battle in 
Other States, CNBC (June 4, 2019, 12:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/04/gig-economy-
bill-advances-in-calif-could-shape-battle-in-other-states.html [https://perma.cc/BH9X-ABP4]. 
148. Bowles & Scheiber, supra note 83. 
149. Shirin Ghaffary, Some Uber and Lyft Drivers Say They Were Misled Into Petitioning 
Against Their Own Worker Rights, VOX (June 27, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode
/2019/6/27/18759387/uber-lyft-drivers-misled-companies-political-campaign [https://perma.cc
/38GB-RAN6].   
150. Graham Rapier, Uber Scored a Major Victory When the US Government Ruled Driv-
ers Aren’t Employees, but Not Everyone Is Happy, BUS. INSIDER (May 16, 2019, 10:08 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-drivers-disappointed-ruling-not-employees-2019-5 [https://
perma.cc/3HB4-BEK7]. 
151. Ghaffary, supra note 149. 
152. National Labor Rights Act of 1935 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2019).  
153. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 38 n.28 
(Cal. 2018); Dai, supra note 46, at 3. 
KALBAKIAN  (DO NOT DELETE) 5/27/20  4:14 PM 
374 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:3 
characterized as those who share the risks and the benefits of a business en-
deavor, gig workers in the video game industry are not “more like entrepre-
neurs than traditional workers.”154  They share a disproportionate amount of 
the market risks, such as mass layoffs during mergers, over the benefits of 
the venture in the form of stock options in some cases.155 
There is also a difference between the workforces of these gig compa-
nies and the video game industry.  Unlike many Lyft drivers, for instance, a 
video game engineer does not intend to engage in temporary or “gig” 
work.156  Although many independent contractors in the video industry are 
treated as seasonal workers and may freelance, they do not take on such jobs 
to supplement their income as do many food delivery or ridesharing com-
pany workers.157  Allowing for video game workers to continue to be classi-
fied as independent contractors thus “undermines the traditional economy of 
full-time workers who rarely change positions and instead focus on a lifetime 
career.”158  While the adaptability of temporary jobs may help those working 
for some gig businesses, the “erosion of traditional economic relationships 
between workers” and businesses should not be dismissed.159 
AB 5 itself appears better tailored to correct the practices of industries 
like gaming that have long operated in the grey areas of employment law 
rather than platform companies such as Uber and Lyft that were borne purely 
out of the gig economy movement.160  Many video game company workers 
 
154. Chappelow, supra note 69. 
155. Patrick Klepek, Video Game Layoffs Are so Common, This Person Built a Website to 
Track Them, VICE (Jan. 15, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/dygp3a/video-
game-layoffs-are-so-common-this-person-built-a-website-to-track-them [https://perma.cc/3APQ-
LPHL]; Putka, supra note 13. 
156. Rapier, supra note 150; see, e.g., Uber and Lyft Just Lost Another Battle in California, 
supra note 126. 
157. See, e.g., Jonathan Rothwell, Earning Income on the Side Is a Large and Growing 
Slice of American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/upshot
/multiple-jobs-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/S9DT-KRHR].  
158. Chappelow, supra note 69.  
159. Id.  
160. Ben Z. Steinberger, Redefining ‘Employee’ in the Gig Economy: Shielding Workers 
from the Uber Model, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 577, 579 (2018).  A platform business 
“creates its own marketplace” by “matchmaking between vendors and customers.”  John Herrman, 
Platform Companies Are Becoming More Powerful — but What Exactly Do They Want?, N.Y. 
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join these companies with hopes of establishing lifelong careers doing work 
they are passionate about.161  Workers whose jobs are more technical have 
received either formal or informal training.162  While the gig model might 
benefit some workers, it only serves as a tool for employers in other indus-
tries to avoid correctly classifying workers who do the same work as em-
ployees.163  Even if Lyft and Uber succeed in passing their ballot measure 
after galvanizing the support of a contingent of their workers and offer lim-
ited concessions, video game companies should attempt to find solutions par-
ticular to their industry.164 
III. THE PROSPECT OF A UNIONIZED VIDEO GAME LABOR FORCE 
 In addition to its contribution to employment law, AB 5 will also pro-
vide more workers with labor protections.  Video game employees in Cali-
fornia will have several options to unionize.  In order to grow video game 
union membership, leaders must first examine the history of entertainment 
trade unions to learn how other industry leaders overcame the resistance of 
companies.  These collective bargaining efforts will increase the leverage of 
employees and allow for them to negotiate for better wages and working 
conditions.  
A. Following the Hollywood Guild Paradigm 
“Plumbers may need unions . . . but not artists.”165  AB 5 will impact 
labor relations in California by mobilizing an entirely new group of artists, a 
development that would surprise Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer’s Irving Thal-
berg.166  In the early 20th century, Thalberg captured the still prevalent, 
 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/magazine/platform-companies-are-
becoming-more-powerful-but-what-exactly-do-they-want.html [https://perma.cc/VC5M-W8MU]. 
161. Campbell, supra note 58. 
162. Id.  
163. Rapier, supra note 150.   
164. Myers, supra note 144. 
165. STEVEN J. ROSS, WORKING-CLASS HOLLYWOOD: SILENT FILM AND THE SHAPING OF 
CLASS IN AMERICA 247 (1998). 
166. Id.  
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misguided view that unions can only benefit the needs of a blue-collar work-
force.167  A labor union is “any association of workers which exists for the 
purpose, in whole or in part, of bargaining on behalf of workers with em-
ployers about the terms or conditions of employment.”168  The Writers Guild 
West and East, Screen Actors Guild-AFTRA, the Director’s Guild of Amer-
ica, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employee, Alliance of Motion 
Picture and Television Producers, and the Teamsters Union are notable en-
tertainment unions.169  Despite the fact that the video game industry currently 
ranks as one of the most profitable sectors in the entertainment industry, 
video game workers remain the most neglected among the entertainment la-
bor pool.170   
Hollywood film and television industry workers have a long legacy of 
participating in labor advocacy movements to improve labor conditions.171  
But the video game industry has not kept pace with other entertainment in-
dustries partly because of the misconception that an organized labor move-
ment “might slow down a company’s ability to adapt to a changing mar-
ket.”172  A parallel workplace atmosphere existed in the early years of the 
film and television industry when vulnerable workers grew discontent over 
“frequent layoffs, one-sided contracts, and creative control exerted by the 
studios.”173  These individuals held “short-term jobs with little supervision 
[and] might theoretically be deemed independent contractors even though 
the most important aspect of their work–its content–[was] subject to control 
by network and studio executives.”174  The organized labor efforts of 
 
167. ROSS, supra note 165, at 247; Semuels, supra note 3. 
168. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 778 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
169. Entertainment Industry Associations, Guilds, and Unions, CAL. FILM COMMISSION 
(2019), http://film.ca.gov/production/associations-guilds/ [https://perma.cc/SRQ3-MU6N]. 
170. Angelo M. D’Argenio, Statistically, Video Games Are Now the Most Popular and 
Profitable Form of Entertainment, GAMERCRATE (July 10, 2018), https://www.gamecrate.com/sta-
tistically-video-games-are-now-most-popular-and-profitable-form-entertainment/20087 [https://
perma.cc/7GGQ-EGHB]. 
171. See generally ROSS, supra note 165. 
172. Dean, supra note 68. 
173. Id. 
174. Catherine Fisk, Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 
202 (2017). 
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entertainment workers following a period of unrest overcame years of anti-
union attitudes in the United States.175  In doing so, they were able to pre-
serve job stability and improve working conditions for these employees with 
“niche specializations whose services are not in consistent demand.”176  
These artists were “tired of being worked to the bone so studio heads could 
reap the spoils of their creative output,” and decided that their grievances 
were best addressed collectively.177  It was only after organized strikes that 
these specialized workers were able to gain any leverage.178 
Gaming studios hire seasoned gamers who are so enveloped in their 
love for the artform that they neglect to realize the value of their exploited 
labor.179  Those who are actual employees are often young creative profes-
sionals willing to undertake roles under less than favorable circumstances in 
hopes of eventually being rewarded with stable careers.  These workers are 
overburdened and then discarded as companies resort to massive layoffs in 
times of financial turmoil.180  To illustrate, Activision Blizzard, one of the 
largest video game companies in the world, discharged eight percent of its 
workforce in early 2019.181  Without union representation, this workforce 
will remain vulnerable to unfair practices. 
California’s new worker classification test can finally pave the way for 
unionization efforts in the video game industry.182  The legal classification 
 
175. W. Harry Fortuna, The Gig Economy Is a Disaster for Workers. Hollywood’s Unions 






179. Dean, supra note 68. 
180. Semuels, supra note 3; Klepek, supra note 155.  
181. Michael Futter, Game Industry Layoffs Driven by Past Mistakes, Uncertain Fu-
ture (Analysts), VARIETY (March 26, 2019, 2:48 PM), https://variety.com/2019/gaming/news
/game-industry-layoffs-driven-by-past-mistakes-uncertain-future-analysts-1203173120/ [https://
perma.cc/649R-VMN6].  
182. See Sam Dean, Major Union Launches Campaign to Organize Video Game and Tech 
Workers, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story
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of employee status confers rights on workers that many—as independent 
contractors—have not received since such workers are not typically entitled 
to applicable labor law protections and cannot be represented by unions.183  
Since the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) only protects employees 
and omits independent contractors from its language, contractors are effec-
tively barred from unionizing.184  While film and television screenwriters 
perform work that might typically be classified as freelance, the National 
Labor Rights Board (“NLRB”) decided that they were employees because 
there was “no essential difference between a free-lance writer and a writer 
working under contract for a term in the manner in which they performed 
their work.”185  The NLRB’s determination has not been extended to cover 
the video game industry, so there is no present guarantee that similarly situ-
ated video game writers will be treated as employees. 
The Dynamex decision may help video game writers overcome some 
of the same obstacles screenwriters and animation writers once faced to se-
cure employee status.186  Since the legislature likely intended to cover jour-
nalists under the “freelance writer” professional services exemption, the ex-
ception will likely not impact video game writers.187  While the NLRB has 
issued contradictory rulings on the status of animation writers, screenwriters 
overcame that challenge in 1938 when the Board definitively ruled that they 
were employees “because producers had the power (even if it was not always 




183. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 416 P.3d 1, 5 (Cal. 
2018). 
184. Jonathan Stoler & Daniel Masakayan, 10 Labor and Employment Considerations in 
Esports, LAW360 (June 6, 2019, 3:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1164984/10-labor-
and-employment-considerations-in-esports [https://perma.cc/VX25-KANJ]. 
185. Fisk, supra note 174, at 186. 
186. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B 662, 669, 686–87 (1938) (relating stu-
dio writers’ contract terms in the 1930s); see generally BKN Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 143 (2001) (af-
firming the “Regional Director’s findings that the individuals in dispute are employees under the 
Act.”); see generally DIC Animation City, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 107 (1989) (striking down the NLRB 
Regional Director’s determination that the freelance animation writers in dispute were employees). 
187. Suhauna Hussain, Freelance Journalists File Suit Alleging AB5 Is Unconstitutional, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-12-17/free-
lance-journalist-ab5-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/92FJ-KRPE]. 
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stories, and to stipulate where writers were to write.”188  The Board in Metro-
Goldwyn Mayer Studios did not think that the freelance nature of their work 
precluded them from employee status because the “only difference between 
[a freelance writer and a writer working under contract for a term] is one of 
length and tenure of employment.”189  The greater flexibility in the multifac-
tor test allowed for courts in the 1930s to reach widely different conclusions 
regarding animation writers.190  Some animation writers were found to be 
employees and others were independent contractors under a different set of 
facts.191  In contrast, the employers of video game writers will likely fail to 
satisfy the more predictable Dynamex test. 
The next obstacle that developers and other workers need to overcome 
is the task of persuading the masses of the value of unions and collective-
bargaining power.  Film and television writers did not view the status of la-
bor as beneath them or at odds with their “demands of entrepreneurial self-
promotion.”192  Without union representation, writers would still “feel vul-
nerable to studio cost-cutting and to being fired” which would leave them 
without health insurance or other pertinent benefits.193  That message needs 
to be effectively communicated to video game workers so that they can will-
ingly join a movement and feel properly represented.  The support of politi-
cal leaders on the national stage might also motivate video game workers to 
pursue their collective bargaining rights.194 
 
188. Fisk, supra note 174, at 186; see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. at 669, 
686–87; see generally BKN, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 143; see generally DIC Animation City, Inc., 295 
N.L.R.B. 107. 
189. Fisk, supra note 174, at 186; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. at 669, 686–
87. 
190. See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. at 669, 686–87. 
191. See id.; see generally BKN, Inc., 333 N.L.R.B. 143; see generally DIC Animation City, 
Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 107. 
192. Fisk, supra note 174, at 193.   
193. Id.  
194. Makena Kelly, Bernie Sanders Applauds the Gaming Industry’s Push for Unioniza-
tion, THE VERGE (June 18, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/18/18683690/ber-
nie-sanders-video-game-industry-union-riot-games-electronic-arts-ea-blizzard-activision [https://
perma.cc/EG3N-S4XL]. 
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B. The Stabilizing Benefits of Unionization in the Industry 
Video game industry unionization has the potential to repair a dysfunc-
tional system, install a discipline of civility, and provide leverage to employ-
ees that the current development in law does not afford.195  The industry’s 
current state of chaos leaves employers in a position of uncertainty.  The 
traditional pattern observed by video game companies includes a lengthy de-
velopment process followed by the possibility of cancellations, massive 
layoffs, and constant mergers while executives remain unaffected.196  In ad-
dition to rampant job insecurity, workers are typically forced to sign manda-
tory arbitration agreements, class action agreements, and non-disclosure 
agreements as a condition of their employment or contractual work.197  In a 
recent incident involving claims of sexual harassment and workplace dis-
crimination at Riot Games, the company allowed new employees to opt out 
of an arbitration provision for sexual harassment claims only after workers 
staged a huge walkout.198  The carve-out did not apply to existing employee 
agreements, but it was nonetheless a prime example of a concession made 
after a worker strike.199  After facing public backlash, the company finally 
settled the class action suit.200  On the other hand, the dispute over mass 
layoffs at Tell-Tale Games in 2018 ended with employees on the losing end 
of a legal battle because they had signed mandatory arbitration agreements 
 
195. Roshan Patel, Esports, Player Positions, and the Benefits of Unionization, 18 DUKE 
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as a condition to their employment.201  They were thus not permitted to pro-
ceed with their complaint alleging a violation of the federal Worker Adjust-
ment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act.202  These cyclical public 
scandals and protests are not a sustainable pattern for businesses to tolerate 
as they will only escalate in the years to come. 
While the potential for collective bargaining has been contemplated by 
video industry workers for years, AB 5 has incidentally revived the dialogue 
over the benefits of unionization and encouraged serious organizing ef-
forts.203  Even if workers are reclassified, employees in the industry lack the 
leverage required to fairly negotiate the terms of their contracts on their own.  
Union representation can help employees improve their chances of prevail-
ing if they take action based on a workplace incident.204  Unionization would 
allow employees to “overcome the extreme imbalance in power found in 
their individual relationships with [employers] by combining their lever-
age.”205  Both parties would be able to negotiate without the exploitation of 
employees with far less bargaining power.206  To illustrate the material ben-
efits of union representation, employees are less likely to prevail under the 
mandatory arbitration system than in a labor arbitration system in which un-
ion representatives deal with employers.207  Even though most arbitration 
provisions allow for employees to hire their own legal representation, em-
ployees often drop their complaints because attorneys are less likely to take 
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on mandatory arbitration cases.208  AB 51 could resolve this matter since it 
prohibits businesses from requiring “any employee to waive any right, fo-
rum, or procedure for a violation of any provision of the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA) or other specific statutes governing em-
ployment as a condition of employment, continued employment, or the 
receipt of any employment-related benefit.”209  But if the law is soon 
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, employees would once again be 
left defenseless without the strength of a union behind them.210 
C. The Path to Forming a Video Game Guild 
There are different ways in which workers can obtain union protection.  
The first option is to join existing unions.211  Their second option is to organ-
ize their own unions.  The only alternative for independent contractors is to 
join a non-trade union.  In order for a union to serve as an employee’s “ex-
clusive representative” for wage, hour, and employment condition issues, 
employers need to be signatories of the proposed guild’s collective bargain-
ing agreement.212  For instance, in the case of the Writers Guild of America 
West (“WGAW”), a company must agree to their Minimum Basic Agree-
ment (“MBA”).213  If the video game company in dispute becomes a signa-
tory, the union can negotiate on behalf of the company’s employees.214  Sig-
natory companies will then need to ensure that their conduct complies with 
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RESOURCES, https://hr.ucmerced.edu/employeelabor-relations/union-representation-faqs [https://
perma.cc/R7VF-DXHX]. 
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the terms of the union agreement.215  A major consequence of union mem-
bership with the WGA, for instance, is that the member will then only be 
permitted to work on projects for signatory companies.216  That might sub-
stantially limit the options for newer artists seeking to gain access to industry 
jobs, but union representation will at the very least be an option. 
In the case of video game writers, employees could greatly benefit from 
union membership or involvement with an established, “militant”217 enter-
tainment union, such as the WGA.  The guild collects copies of writers’ em-
ployment agreements to enforce its rules.218  Video game writers would be 
expected to do the same.  An additional benefit is that a multitude of WGA 
departments help accommodate different grievances regarding failed pay, 
contract provisions, creative rights, and pension and healthcare benefits.219  
The WGAW has spearheaded efforts to include video game writers by es-
tablishing a Videogame Writers Caucus.220  The express mission of the Cau-
cus is to promote the “professional and artistic interests of interactive writ-
ers” and “raise the writers’ status and influence within the industry, build a 
community of professional videogame writers within the WGAW, and ex-
pand the coverage of videogame writing under WGA contracts.”221  WGAW 
caucuses are “open to both WGA members and non-members” in animation, 
independent film, nonfiction, and video games.222  Caucus membership of-
fers educational programs for professional writers, the opportunity to receive 
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a Videogame Writing Award, network with other writers and guilds, and 
“expand WGA coverage to writers working in the videogame industry.”223 
It is important to note that as it stands, WGA Caucus membership does 
not necessarily afford members traditional union protections and rights since 
video game companies are not signatories.224  Those that qualify are not all 
technically union members.  Caucus membership itself does not confer vot-
ing rights on writers.225  The WGAW Script Registration Service only re-
quires one writing credit or past employment under a WGA contract for a 
video game.226  That requirement is also relatively lax compared to the pro-
cess of obtaining actual guild membership.227  But the guild’s willingness to 
involve non-union signatory company writers may have recently declined.  
After 10 years of offering a WGA award for exceptional Videogame Writ-
ing, the guild decided that it would not honor a recipient in 2020.228  A 
spokesperson suggested that a decision could not be made because presently 
since there is not a “critical mass of video games covered by the WGA” from 
which to select.229  In the past, qualifying video game scripts have included 
submissions that were not under guild jurisdiction.230  For instance, writers 
for TellTale Games, Sony Interactive Entertainment, Insomniac Games, and 
Obsidian Entertainment were nominated in 2019, but none of the companies 
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are listed as WGA signatories.231  The guild’s statement suggests that they 
intend to cease supporting non-signatories since such companies have not 
agreed to the WGA’s conditions.  Mass reclassification may compel employ-
ers to reconsider becoming signatories in order to regulate their business and 
gain prestigious recognition. 
Video game workers also have the more desirable option to instead 
form their own unions that could model the WGA’s process.  In the event 
that there is a huge shift in the video game workforce after the advent of AB 
5, notwithstanding any simultaneous employer efforts to curb this reclassifi-
cation by threatening to relocate, employees have the right to form unions.232  
In order to form a bargaining unit, workers could organize across titles or 
employers as long as they form a “sufficient ‘community of interest’ that a 
union can reasonably represent those employees.”233  Under the NLRA, at 
least thirty percent of the employees would need to support unionization in 
a petition order to proceed to an NLRB election.234 
Once a union has been established, video game companies could then 
apply to become signatories to their collective bargaining agreements.235  
The agreement should address payment minimums, limitations on span of 
work, health care plans, options, training programs, parental leave, and other 
relevant topics that video game union leaders would negotiate.236  If video 
game union membership becomes more prevalent, the union could create its 
own strike or unfair lists to publicize forms of unfair conduct of video com-
panies.237  To illustrate, the Writers Guild uses its influence to document a 
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list of companies that have refused to sign their MBA, wrongfully failed to 
“participate in grievance and arbitration procedures,” or violated the NLRA 
in any manner.238  This would help inexperienced professionals hoping to 
join the gaming workforce select a company that was deemed friendly to 
employees by the union.  In order to police its members, the union could bind 
its members to a rule that prohibits them from entering into a contract with 
any company on the unfair list.239  This would all serve as pressure on video 
game companies. 
Another benefit to forming separate unions for video game employees 
is that these unions can address issues unique to the industry.  Video game 
writers will not need to shoehorn their particular issues into a discussion nor-
mally centered on film and television employees.  The ability to center the 
discussion on video game employees will allow leaders to more precisely 
define these jobs and standardize the conditions across different companies.  
Such an agreement can clearly delineate publishing and developer compa-
nies as well as first, second, and third-party developers.  It can also define 
certain patterns found in the video game industry, like “crunch” periods, after 
union leaders and employers negotiate an agreeable outcome on overtime 
payment.  In the case of the Writers Guild’s 2017 MBA, the document 
clearly outlines different stages of the writing process, intellectual property 
rights, and job titles that would be applied to video game contracts.240 
It is vital for these new unions to gain established signatories like Nin-
tendo, one of the largest international development companies, which pur-
ports to ensure “employee welfare and well-being” as a part of their obliga-
tion to stakeholders on their company website.241  These measures include 
diversity and inclusion efforts, ergonomic workstations, paid childcare, and 
employee assistance programs.242  But the reality on the ground is different 
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alleged bias towards younger recruits who can be molded by the company 
over the years.243  This is the sort of activity that should be monitored by 
unions. 
Video game union leadership will have the power and responsibility to 
shape the narrative around the industry if they gain enough resources.  Over 
time, non-signatory companies might eventually adjust their own employ-
ment agreements to resemble the standard that is established once unions 
gain enough leverage.  Even so, video game company executive boards will 
likely have the resources to outspend union leaders and push back against 
organizing efforts.  These companies might decide to follow the example of 
leaders in the gig economy who are lobbying for exemptions.  It will be the 
responsibility of future video game union leaders to distinguish video game 
industry jobs from other gig industry jobs like rideshare and food delivery 
driving. 
While independent contractors do not presently have the rights to col-
lectively bargain, the unionization of employees may still indirectly benefit 
them and incidentally improve their workplace conditions.244  These inde-
pendent contractors still have traditional contractual remedies and even rem-
edies for discrimination disputes under the Unruh Civil Rights Act in Cali-
fornia.245  Some freelancers can also join a non-profit organization, such as 
the Freelancers Union that provides different types of insurance for inde-
pendent contractors.246  The organization is limited because it is not a trade 
union, so it does not have the legal jurisdiction to negotiate on behalf of these 
contractors.247  It has nonetheless been influential in raising concerns about 
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the treatment of alt-labor workers and could therefore provide a platform for 
video game contractors.248 
IV. THE ROLE OF STRATEGIC CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN 
FACILITATING LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
Under the stakeholder theory of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(“CSR”), corporations such as video game companies have the ethical re-
sponsibility to prevent or mitigate societal harms they cause and pursue so-
cial betterment in their “ordinary course of business.”249  CSR is a “self-reg-
ulating business model that helps a company be socially accountable—to 
itself, its stakeholders, and the public.”250  This responsible behavior includes 
ensuring legal compliance.251  It would also entail the implementation of ap-
propriate health and wellness measures, environmental policies, and “ethical 
labor practices.”252  While profitability is still a foundational motivation, an 
approach like “strategic CSR” emphasizes long-term benefits derived from 
“positive publicity and goodwill.”253 
The most relevant question on the topic of corporate purpose is 
“whether the law should encourage corporations” to act as “socially respon-
sible” entities.254  Such a directive would imply that companies “sacrifice . . . 
some profit to achieve some social good . . . .”255  A company’s lower 
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employee turnover rate and loyal employee base could contribute to the max-
imization of revenue.  Employees who are disillusioned with the larger stu-
dios they once revered are now turning to independent outlets in order to take 
more creative risks.256  Although this option does not necessarily enhance 
job security due to the inherent financial risks of embarking on an independ-
ent project, this may become a growing problem as industry veterans exit big 
studios looking for viable alternatives.  Employees are realizing that the idea 
of “corporate job security” may be overrated and a myth altogether.257  While 
employee training can be costly, investing in employees over the years can 
foster a positive work environment that helps avoid burnout and creative 
stagnation.  A healthy work environment would therefore do more than just 
foster positive morale among employees.  It would offer stability to employ-
ers who would then be responsible for creating and implementing “policies, 
procedures, strategies, and employment terms that minimize the risk of union 
organizations” with the help of their legal counsel.258 
The video game industry’s opportunism in employing “aggressive reg-
ulatory arbitrage can erode social license and create a more costly environ-
ment for sustainable operation.”259  Social license is derived from the “per-
mission from communities and stakeholders” for a particular business to 
exist and be held accountable.260  Businesses suffer an audience cost if they 
engage in activities that are frowned upon in both legal and non-legal circles 
alike.261  For instance, news that Uber had engaged in aggressive regulatory 
arbitrage through misclassification resulted in strikes, boycotts, and negative 
social media campaigns that damaged the company’s public image.262  The 
video game industry’s longstanding reputation of “dangling the carrot” for 
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independent contractors who hope to become full-time employees is against 
federal regulations.263  The practice of hiring contractors as part of a “trial 
run” is not permitted because worker classifications are not meaningless ti-
tles that can be utilized by employers wishing to test the waters.264  Classifi-
cations have legal implications for labor, employment, and tax law pur-
poses.265  Thus, if a worker strung along as an independent contractor has 
been acting as an employee under even the previous, more employer-friendly 
common law test, then an auditor can subject the employer to fines and pen-
alties.266  In addition, the current approach used by some video game com-
panies of hiring contractors for nine months and then asking them to take 
time off before rehiring them is transparently illegal.267  As stakeholders con-
tinue to invest in the industry, misclassification could lead to actual liability.  
While having a workforce comprised of more employees invariably exposes 
them to more litigation, the risks of resisting legal compliance should not be 
understated or underestimated by investors. 
Since the video game industry is not immune to public and stakeholder 
pressure, it is in the best interest of stockholders to force legal compliance 
because of their optimal position in the corporation and the potential adverse 
impact of ongoing gaming industry scandals on their investments.  Stock-
holders have every right to rebuke corporate managers for allowing misclas-
sification to have prevailed, since it could cost the company up to seventy 
cents for every dollar paid to the contractor to rectify the situation.268  Public 
relations scandals are also costly.  Among countless other anecdotes from 
workers, the CEO of the game developer and publisher, Nicalis, recently 
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faced allegations of racism in the workplace.269  The CEO eventually con-
ceded that his comments to employees were “indefensible and unaccepta-
ble,” but not before public pressure was exerted.270  The corporation was 
eventually forced to issue a statement to assure the public that they did not 
tolerate “abusive workplace environments or discrimination” after com-
plaints surfaced.271  In the case of the Riot Games walkout, it was once again 
public pressure that compelled the company to reconfigure their arbitration 
agreements to allow a carveout for sexual harassment claims.272  These no-
table examples reveal a willingness to appease the public within certain 
bounds.  Further, these examples indicate that video game companies are 
struggling to deal with public backlash. 
The current video game industry model presents not only ethical liabil-
ities but will soon reveal itself to be a strategic failure as well.  Supporters of 
CSR would argue that any given company’s “moral responsibility to any in-
dividual or groups where it might inflict actual or potential injury (physical, 
mental, economic, spiritual, and emotional) from a particular course of ac-
tion,” supplants the goal to maximize the company’s profitability.273  Poten-
tial wage theft claims arising out of unpaid overtime during crunch periods 
and widespread misclassification are amalgams of such harms.  When devel-
opment companies choose to hire independent contractors to fulfill the re-
sponsibilities of employees, their cost-saving mechanism costs the state mil-
lions in tax revenue.274  In addition to its actual workforce, these companies 
owe a duty to the taxpayers of the states in which they operate.  While 
smaller, still-emerging companies may have financial limitations that inhibit 
them from offering more full-time employee positions, larger, more estab-
lished companies have the resources to properly classify their employees.  
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However, they forgo doing so because they have not yet been compelled by 
the state to absorb these costs. 
Although some gig companies have chosen to take a more combative 
approach with the legislature over the scope of AB 5, video game industry 
boards would benefit from getting ahead of the bad press by adjusting their 
practices to avoid losing political capital.275  Ride-sharing companies like 
Lyft and Uber—the intended targets of AB 5—introduced a ballot measure 
to become exempt after they were unable to implement the language in the 
actual Bill.276  Like those companies, video game companies certainly save 
taxation and employee benefit costs and can more easily lay off workers 
when the workload is less demanding by classifying them as contractors.  But 
in doing so, they have also become vulnerable to the “risk of government 
scrutiny” and may lack a loyal, consistent workforce to support them should 
a ballot measure be introduced.277  Open defiance towards the California 
Legislature’s intentions would not help the industry gain favor in the political 
process.278  To illustrate, in 2018, the New York City Council passed a min-
imum wage law for drivers in order to thwart Uber’s efforts to benefit from 
engaging in regulatory arbitrage through misclassification.279  Local Califor-
nia political bodies can do the same in order to punish video game companies 
for noncompliance. 
The potential improvement in brand value for video game companies 
from its currently held unflattering reputation can also encourage them to 
develop a more “sustainable or profitable business model.”280  CSR is no 
longer considered a hindrance to company success, but rather a sound busi-
ness decision to look beyond profit-maximization of shareholders.  In fact, 
as previously delineated, legal compliance could actually help increase a 
company’s bottom line or, at the very least, avoid costly repercussions.  
While gaming companies have raised money for worthy causes and 
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scholarships, in accepting that “economic viability is something business 
does for society as well,” their generosity should start with regard to their 
own workforce.281 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although much is yet to be determined until after gig industries present 
their ballot measure in California, AB 5 will likely compel the video game 
companies to restructure their workforce.  This would undo years of compa-
nies maneuvering around ambiguous legal precedents in employee classifi-
cation to avoid classifying their workers as employees.282  Since employers 
will not be able to overcome the ABC test and most industry job titles do not 
fall under the legislation’s stated exceptions, these workers will need to be 
reclassified as employees.  The cumulative effect of reclassification will al-
low for the state to recoup tax revenue and relieve the public that has been 
unjustly required to “assume additional financial burdens with respect to 
such workers . . . .”283  Reclassification cases will reveal that the industry’s 
“harmful maneuvering” not only shifted costs onto workers and taxpayers, 
but also placed companies that properly classified their workers at a compet-
itive disadvantage.284  The threat of reclassification will also require busi-
nesses to apply safeguards to avoid wage and hour litigation arising out of 
perpetual crunch periods.  After reclassification, the larger employee work-
force can then begin to unionize in order to advocate for better work condi-
tions so that Sledgehammer Games is no longer an exceptional example.  Al-
leviating the uncertainties that burden the current workforce through legal 
compliance will ultimately improve employee morale, retention rates, com-
pany culture, and workplace creativity.285 
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